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Abstract
The present study examines the importance of Schumpeterian
profits in the United States economy. Schumpeterian profits are
defined as those profits that arise when firms are able to
appropriate the returns from innovative activity. We first show
the underlying equations for Schumpeterian profits. We then
estimate the value of these profits for the non-farm business
economy. We conclude that only a miniscule fraction of the
social returns from technological advances over the 1948-2001
period was captured by producers, indicating that most of the
benefits of technological change are passed on to consumers
rather than captured by producers.
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The United States economy has benefited from rapid technological
change over the last decade. The present study inquires into the fraction
of the benefits from new technologies that have been captured by
innovators (these being Schumpeterian profits) as compared to the
fraction that have been passed on in lower prices.
The question of the appropriability of technological change is
important for several reasons. First, we want to understand the role of
innovational profits in total profits. Second, investors want to understand
the importance of innovation in stock-market returns. Third, to the extent
that innovation leads to higher wealth, there is a wealth effect of
technological change on aggregate demand (this being the “Greenspan
effect” posited by Fed chairman Alan Greenspan). This study examines
each of these phenomena.

I. A Model of Appropriability and Schumpeterian Profits
A. Background
Endogenous growth theory, along with the theory of induced
innovation, has developed important new approaches to understanding
the role of innovation in economic growth. Joseph Schumpeter
introduced modern approaches in his pathbreaking book, The Theory of
Economic Development.1 The formal theory of induced innovation arose in
the 1960s in an attempt to understand why technological change appears
to have been largely labor saving.2 More recently, theories of induced
technological change were revived as the new growth theory, pioneered
by Robert Lucas and Paul Romer.3 This has blossomed into a major
research field, with a wide variety of theories and applications.4
Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, variously dated as 1911 or 1912, available
currently in translation published by Transaction Books, New Brunswick, N.J.,
1983.

1

See Richard Nelson, “The Simple Economics of Basic Scientific Research,” Journal
of Political Economy, vol. 67, 1959, pp. 297-306, and Kenneth Arrow, “Economic
Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention,” in Richard Nelson, The
Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity, Princeton University Press for National
Bureau of Economic Research, 1962, pp. 609-625.
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See Robert E. Lucas, “On the Mechanics of Economic Development,” Journal of
Monetary Economics, January 1988, pp. 3-32, and Paul Romer, “Endogenous
Technological Change,” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 98, October 1990, No. 5,
Part 2, pp. S71-S102.
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Virtually all studies of induced innovation have been theoretical.
With few exceptions, they do not lay out a set of testable hypotheses or
ones that can be used to model the innovation process at an industrial
level. There are to my knowledge no estimates of total Schumpeterian
profits by industry or for the entire economy.
The underlying idea to be developed in this section is
straightforward. Numerous individuals and firms in a modern economy
are engaged in innovative activities designed to produce new and
improved goods and services along with processes that reduce the cost of
production. Some of these are formalized in legal ownership of
intellectual property rights such as patents, copyrights, and trademarks,
while others are no more than trade secrets or early-mover advantages.
Some of the innovative activities produce extra-normal profits (called
Schumpeterian profits), which are profits above those that would
represent the normal return to investment and risk-taking.
In this study, we take a slightly restrictive definition of
Schumpeterian profits. These comprise only the profits that exceed the
risk-adjusted return to innovative investments. In other words, any
research and development (R&D) that yields a normal return on
investment will lead to an increase in output or decrease in inputs but no
increase in appropriately measured5 multifactor productivity (MFP).
Most of the innovations produce social value as well as private
value. When copy machines replace scribes, or computers replace hand
calculations, the social cost of producing a given amount of goods and
services declines. It is well established that innovators do not generally
capture the entire social value of inventive and innovational activity.6

A comprehensive survey is provided in Philippe Aghion and Peter Howitt,
Endogenous Growth Theory, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1997.
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Because of U.S. accounting conventions, R&D is treated as a current rather than a
capital expense and will distort measures of MFP growth. Additionally, some
R&D is devoted to new products, which may not be captured in price indexes; this
factor will probably underestimate MFP growth.
6 There is a vast literature discussing the relationship between social and private
returns to innovation. See Zvi Griliches, “Research Expenditures and Growth
Accounting,” in M. Brown, ed., Science and Technology in Economic Growth, New
York, Wiley, 1973; Zvi Griliches, “Productivity, R&D, and Basic Research at the
5
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To a first approximation, it is generally believed, most of the value
of new products and processes are eventually passed on to consumers in
the form of lower prices of goods and services. But not all, and not
immediately. Often, inventors and innovators get at least a slice of the
social returns to productivity growth. Although there is scattered
evidence that the degree of appropriability varies greatly across
industries, there is little evidence on the size of the slice that goes to the
originators of technological change and no evidence on the size of
Schumpeterian profits for the entire economy. Some industries like
pharmaceuticals have high rates of profit and appear to capture a
substantial fraction of the value of new products during (and sometimes
after!) the patent lifetimes. Other industries, such as farming, are ones,
which have enjoyed very rapid productivity growth without a
corresponding high profitability of farmers or farm-equipment
manufacturers.

Firm Level in the 1970s,” American Economic Review, vol. 76, 1986, pp. 141-54;
Bronwyn Hall, “The Private and Social Returns to Research and Development,” in
Bruce Smith and Claude Barfield, Technology, R&D, and the Economy, Brookings,
1995, pp. 140-183; Adam Jaffe, “Technological Opportunity and Spillover of R&D:
Evidence from Firms’ Patents, Profits, and Market Value,” American Economic
Review, vol. 76, 1986, pp. 984-1001; Adam Jaffe, Manuel Trajenberg, and Rebecca
Henderson, “Geographical Localization of Knowledge Spillovers as evidence by
Patent Citations,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1993; Richard Levin, Alvin
Klevorick, Richard Nelson, and Sidney Winter, “Appropriating the Returns from
Industrial Research and Development,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, no.
3, 1987, pp. 783- 820; Edwin Mansfield, “Social and Private Rates of Return from
Industrial Innovations,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1977, vol. 91, pp. 221-40,
“Basic Research and Productivity Increase in Manufacturing,” American Economic
Review, vol. 70, 1980, pp. 863-873, “How Fast Does New Industrial Technology
Leak Out?” Journal of Industrial Economics, vol. 34, 1985, pp. 217-223,
“Macroeconomic Policy and Technological Change,” in Jeffrey C. Fuhrer and Jane
Sneddon Little, eds, Technology and Growth, Conference Proceedings, Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston, 1996, pp. 183-200; Edwin Mansfield et al., Social and
Private Rates of Return from Industrial Innovations, 1995, NTIS, Washington, D. C.;
and Nathan Associates, Net Rates of Return on Innovation, Report to the National
Science Foundation, 1978.
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B. A Two-Period Model
We can formalize these issues as follows. The model that follows is
just a sketch of how innovational profits arise. There is no attempt to
derive this from first microeconomic principles as that would probably
either impose unrealistic limitations on the assumptions or produce
untestable implications.
The basic assumption is that there is a stream of innovations in an
industry, which lead to a more or less continuous reduction in the cost of
production, ct , for firm or industry i (I suppress the notation that this
refers to industry i where inessential). Some of the innovations are in the
public domain, such as the availability of improved weather forecasts.
These are inappropriable and are therefore passed on in lower costs and
prices of goods or services. Other cost reductions are at least partially
appropriable by the producers in the industry and are only partially
passed on in price reductions. For those innovations whose cost
reductions are partially appropriated, the producers or innovators will
have temporary increases in profits, which are labeled Schumpeterian
profits.
The two-period version of this model will illustrate the basic points.
Consider a perfectly competitive industry where the technology is
constant returns to scale. The level of productivity is represented by At ,
and the cost of production is Ct = kAt , where k is a constant. In period 0,
the dominant technology is widely available and determines the market
price. The dominant technology has cost C0 and the good has a market
price of P0 = C0 .
A new innovation arrives in period 1 and lowers production cost to
C1 < C0 . Assume that the inventor can appropriate the fraction α of the
cost savings from the innovation; α is the fundamental appropriability
ratio, which will be estimated below. Then for small innovations, the
inventor maximizes profit by setting the price at P1 = C1 + α (C0 –C1).
Figure 1 shows the initial competitive price, new cost, and new price
under these assumptions. The shaded profit region is Schumpeterian
profits. As is shown in Figure 1, the second-period price (P1) lies between
competitive cost of the old technology (C0) and the new lower cost of the
innovation (C1). The extent to which P1 is above the C1 depends upon the
appropriability ratio.
5

Figure 1. Technological Change and Schumpeterian Profits
The shaded region shows the Schumpeterian profits, while social surplus
is the quadrilateral bounded by the P0 = C0 line, the demand curve, the
C1 line and the vertical axis. The ratio of Schumpeterian profits to social
gains is determined by the appropriability ratio.

6

The inventor=s profits are equal to (P1 - C1)X1, which can be
approximated by α (C0 - C1)X0 = α [(C0 - C1)/C0](P0 X0) = α (∆A 1 /A 0 )Q0 ,
where Qt = Pt Xt is nominal output. In words, the private value of the
innovation to the innovator is approximately equal to the appropriability ratio
times the rate of improvement in technology times the nominal value of output.
To put this theory in a dynamic framework, we need to take into
account the erosion of Schumpeterian profits over time. These temporary
profits decay because of such factors as the expiration or nonenforcement of patents, the ability of others to imitate or innovate around
innovations, the introduction of superior goods and services, and the loss
of first-mover advantages. I will model the erosion of Schumpeterian
profits as a simple exponential-decay process with decay rate λ per year.
This implies that if an innovation was introduced θ years ago, the
appropriation rate would be αe-λθ at the end of θ years. Finally, to
simplify the analysis, I assume for this exposition that prices and costs
are normalized so that the cost of inputs is always 1. This implies that
any reduction in costs is due only to productivity growth.

C. A Multi-Period Model
Using the framework just introduced, this implies that if there were
only one innovation, which occurs in period (t-θ), current price would be:
Pt = Ct - αe-λθ (Ct - Ct-θ ).

(1)

Here, α is the first-period appropriability of innovations, while the
appropriability θ periods after the innovation is αe-λθ. If the stream of
innovations is continuous, then current price would be determined by
the past innovations and the extent to which Schumpeterian profits had
eroded. Because an innovation θ periods ago yielded a cost improvement
•

of C t −θ , we can integrate all the cost improvements over time to obtain
the complete version of (1):
(2)

P t = Ct - ∫

0

∞

•

αe-λθ C t −θ dθ.

The integral on the right hand side of (2) is the accumulated
Schumpeterian profits, which I define as St :
7

(3)

St = ∫

0

∞

•

- αe-λθ C t −θ dθ.

Note that since costs are falling over time, St is positive.
Finally, note that if the rate of productivity growth is constant at h*
per year, then (2) and (3) simplify to:
(4)

(Pt - Ct)/Ct = ∫

0

∞

•

- αe-λθ [ C t −θ /Ct] dθ = α h*/(λ - h*) .

We define µt as the Schumpeterian profit margin. The equilibrium
Schumpeterian profit margin is equal to the appropriability ratio times a
dynamic factor that equals the ratio of the rate of productivity growth
divided by the difference between the rate of decay of Schumpeterian
profits and the rate of productivity growth. The upper limit on the rate of
profit is the appropriability factor, but this upper limit gets diluted by the
evaporation of Schumpeterian profits.
Define the profit margin as µt = (Pt - Ct)/Ct . Then take the time
derivative of the markup and use equations (2) and (3), which yields
•

∞

•

•

•

µ t −θ Ct + C t µt = d[∫ - αe-λθ C t −θ dθ ]/dt = - λSt - α C t
0

•

Since C t −θ /Ct = - ht, this reduces to
(5)

•

µ t −θ = ( α + µt ) ht - λ µt

In steady state, where µt and ht are constant at µ* and h*, this reduces to
(6)

µ* = α h*/( λ – h*)

which is identical to equation (4).
We can also derive equation (5) in difference form, which yields
(7)

µt = (1 - λ)µt -1 + α ht + µt-1 ht
8

The major coefficients of interest are λ, which is the rate of depreciation
of Schumpeterian profits, and α, which is the Schumpeterian
appropriation ratio.
Equations (6) and (7) are two alternative representations of the
relationship between the Schumpeterian profit margin and the rate of
technological progress. Equation (6) would be appropriate in
circumstances where the industry was in “innovational steady state” –
that is, where the rate of innovation was more or less constant. Equation
(7) would be appropriate where the rate of technological change were
changing, such as occurred in the new economy over the last decade.

D. A Multi-Period Calibrated Model
We can illustrate the model here using a calibrated model of
innovation. For this purpose, I assume follow the model described in the
last section. Invention is assumed to be uncertain and follow a beta
distribution with parameters (3, .3):
ht is distributed as .02 β(3, .3)
This produces a median annual productivity growth of 0.3 percent per
year and a standard deviation of around 10 percent per year. Multifactor
productivity of the low-cost producer is equal to ht . The other
parameters are:
α = appropriability factor = 0.2
λ = depreciation rate = 0.08 per year
Figures 2 and 3 show a typical simulation of the system. Figure 2 shows
the monopoly cost as the solid line as well as the market price with +
marks. The market price is always higher than the monopoly price
because of partial appropriability. Additionally, when there is little
innovation (as between period 27 and 37), the price-cost margin tends to
shrink as the Schumpeterian margin depreciates.
Figure 3 shows the Schumpeterian margin, defined as the ratio γ =
(market price – monopoly cost)/market price. This margin shoots up
after a major invention, and then declines as Schumpeterian profits
dissipate. From equation (6), the theoretical average Schumpeterian
margin is
9

µ* = αh*/( λ –h*) = 0.2 .018/(.08-.018 ) = 5.8 percent,
whereas the average from the simulation shown in Figure 3 is 4.3
percent. The difference is due to the non-linearity of the margin equation.
Figure 4 compares the price trajectories of two simulations with the
same underlying technological shocks but with different appropriability
ratios, while Figure 5 shows the associated profit margins. For the high
appropriability ratio of 0.5, the Schumpeterian margin is higher as actual
price tends to remain above the monopoly cost while with the lower
appropriability ratio of 0.5 there is little daylight between monopoly cost
and price.
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Figure 2. Simulation of cost and price in Schumpeterian model (n = 50)

.24
(price-cost)/price
.20
.16
.12
.08
.04
.00
2100

2200

2300

2400

2500

2600

2700

2800

Figure 3. Simulation Schumpeterian profit margin (n = 1000)

11

2900

3000

-18.6
log (monopoly cost)
log (actual price -- low approp)
log (actual price -- high approp)

-18.7
-18.8
-18.9
-19.0
-19.1
-19.2
-19.3
05

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

Figure 4. Price trajectories under low and high appropriability (n = 50)
(Upper line (o) has appropriability factor of 0.5 while lower line (x) has
appropriability factor of 0.1)

.6
Schum. prof. margin
(high appropriabilty)

.5
Schum. prof.
margin (low
appropriabilty)

.4
.3
.2
.1
.0
2100

2200

2300

2400

2500

2600

2700

2800

2900

3000

Figure 5. Schumpeterian margins with high and low appropriability (n =
1000)

12

II. A Macroeconomic Estimate of Schumpeterian Profits
This section provides estimates of the importance of Schumpeterian
profits for the nonfarm business sector (the farm sector is excluded
because land values are such a large fraction of total capital in that
sector). The basic calculation is the impact of multifactor productivity
(MFP) growth on capital income. In addition, I will show that the results
are insensitive to whether the variable is multifactor productivity or
labor productivity. The data are prepared by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) for their calculations of multifactor productivity. The
analysis here primarily uses a margin defined as total property income
divided by total costs (m1). This margin is available from the BLS data
and has relatively few conceptual difficulties.7
We should note that the theory applies to all innovations, domestic
and foreign. In practice, the technique used here can only estimate
appropriability for individual firms or countries. In this study, for
example, we estimate the impact of multifactor productivity growth in
the United States on innovational profits in the United States. Since there
are both spill-outs to the international economy from domestic
innovation as well as spill-ins to the U.S. economy from foreign
innovations, our estimates are likely to be distorted. The direction of the
distortion is difficult to determine, however, because the procedure is
likely to overestimate the appropriability of domestic innovations
(because some productivity impacts occur abroad) and underestimate
domestic appropriability because of foreign innovations (which affect
productivity but will not affect domestic profits).
For this purpose, we estimate eight different specifications. These
are annual data and decadal data; a linear equilibrium relationship and a
non-linear equilibrium relationship; and in level and first difference. The
linear equation takes the following form:
(8)

µ(t) = γ0 + γ1 h(t) + ε(t)

where µ(t) is the Schumpeterian profit margin, h(t) is the rate of growth
of multifactor productivity, ε(t) is a random disturbance, and γ0 and γ1
are estimated coefficients.

7

All data are available at http://www.bls.gov/web/prod3.supp.toc.htm.
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In equation (8), to determine the appropriability parameter, we take
the derivative of µ with respect to h, which yields:
dµ/dh = αh*/( λ – h*)2
from which we derive
α = [dµ/dh] ( λ – h*)2/ h*
where [dµ/dh] is the regression coefficient, λ is set a priori at 0.2, and h* is
the mean of the sample for h.
(9)

dµ/dh = αh*/( λ – h*)2

The non-linear specification takes the following form, which
estimates the appropriability coefficient directly conditional on the
depreciation rate:
(10) µ(t) = γ0 + α { h*/( λ – h*)} + ε(t)
The results of these estimates for the non-farm business sector are
shown in Table 1. The overall estimates are quite consistent for the
different specifications and show an appropriability factor of between 5
percent and 10 percent for the non-farm business sector. Standard errors
are consistently estimated only for the third and fourth rows, but these
show quite well determined coefficients, with standard errors in the
order of 1.5 percentage points.
Figure 6 shows a plot of the left- and right-hand sides of equation
(9). The dots are the data for1949-2001, while the line shows the
equilibrium relationship between productivity and the gross margin that
would be consistent with an appropriability factor of 5 percent.
There is no consensus on the appropriate depreciation rate for
R&D, with estimates ranging from 10 to 25 percent per year. The
calculations in Table 1 assume a depreciation rate of 20 percent per year,
which is consistent with data from patent renewals.8 It has not been
See Ariel Pakes and Margaret Simpson, “Patent Renewal Data,” Brookings Papers
on Economic Activity, Microeconomics, 1989, pp. 331-410 and the references therein.
Estimates of the depreciation rate for patent renewals are higher than the numbers

8
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possible with the macroeconomic data to estimate the appropriability
ratio and the deprecation rate jointly. However, the first set of four
columns in Table 2 shows estimated values of the appropriability ratio
conditional on different depreciation rates. The appropriability ratios are
clearly sensitive to the depreciation assumption. The Schumpeterian
profit margins are much less sensitive, however, as is shown in the last
set of four columns in Table 2. The average value of the Schumpeterian
margin across the eight specifications varies from a high of 0.55 percent
for the lowest depreciation rate to a high of 0.58 for the highest
depreciation rate.
The appropriability applies only to the first year of an innovation.
After the first year, the appropriability depreciates over time because of
imitation and loss of market power. Figure 7 shows the time path of
appropriability for the first estimate in Table 1 and for two alternative
depreciation rates. Lower depreciation rates lead to lower initial
appropriability ratios than those calculated with higher depreciation
rates, but this ranking is reversed through depreciation after a few years.
Additionally, we attempted to estimate the dynamic specification
in equation (7) above. The results were uniformly unsatisfactory, with
negative depreciation factors and wildly differing appropriability factors.
The difficulty is apparently the cyclical nature of productivity and
profitability, which yields a spurious relationship between the two series
that is not related to underlying trend multifactor productivity. Given
the difficulties in capturing the dynamic specification, it is dropped for
the balance of this study.
It is useful to determine how sensitive the estimates are to the
measure of productivity that is used. The second column of Table 3
shows estimates of the appropriability ratio where we substitute BLS’s
measure of labor productivity for multifactor productivity. A comparison
of these estimates with those from Table 1, shown for convenience in the
first column of Table 3, indicate essentially the same estimates. Also (not

in the literature on the returns to research and development (which cluster around
15 percent per year). However, the latter generally refer to social rather than
private depreciation, and the private rate would generally exceed the social rate
due to erosion of market position of the innovator. (See Bronwyn H. Hall,
“Industrial Research during the 1980s: Did the Rate of Return Fall?” Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity, Microeconomics, 1993, pp. 289-343.)

15

shown), the standard errors of the coefficients are very similar to those in
Table 1.
Figure 8 shows the importance of estimated Schumpeterian profits
in total corporate profits over the 1948-2001 period. The estimated share
varied from a low of -1.3 percent to a high of 6.3 percent of corporate
profits (the negative number arises because of negative measured MFP
growth for several years in the 1974-82 period).
Finally, we can estimate the overall appropriability of innovation
using both the appropriability coefficient and the depreciation rate. The
central estimates of these two parameters are 0.07 and 0.20. If we
combine these estimates with a growth rate of the economy of 3 percent
per year and a discount rate on Schumpeterian profits of 10 percent per
year, this implies that 2.2 percent of the total present value of social
returns to innovation are captured by innovators. The highest and lowest
present value of that ratio from all the estimates in Tables 1 and 2 are 1.3
percent and 3.3 percent.
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Regression
Coefficients

Sector and method
Equilibrium: Annual
Linear equilibrium
Level +AR
Difference
Non-linear equilibrium
Level +AR
Difference
Equilibrium: Decadal [d]
Linear equilibrium
Level +AR
Difference
Non-linear equilibrium
Level +AR
Difference

Appropriability
Ratio [a]

Equilibrium Share
of Schumpeterian
Profits

Coefficient

Standard
error of
coefficient

Coefficient

0.391
0.376

0.090
0.083

7.8%
7.5%

1.8% [b]
1.7% [b]

0.55%
0.53%

0.062
0.059

0.015
0.014

6.2%
5.9%

1.5%
1.4%

0.44%
0.42%

0.521
0.522

0.134
0.129

10.4%
10.4%

2.7% [b]
2.6% [b]

0.74%
0.74%

0.092
0.091

0.023
0.022

9.2%
9.1%

2.3% [c]
2.2% [c]

0.65%
0.64%

Standar
d error

[a] All estimates assume the depreciation rate is 20 percent per year (exponential).
[b] These standard errors take the standard errors and scale them proportionally for the ratio
of the appropriability coefficient to the regression coefficient.
[c] These standard errors are inconsistent because the samples overlap.
[d] The decadal estimates take 10-year averages of margins and total factor productivity growth.
Notes on regression equations:
The linear equilibrium estimates are equations of the following form:

µ(t) = γ0 + γ1 h(t) + ε(t)
where

α = γ1 ( λ – h*)2/ h*
The (lambda = 0.2) equilibrium estimates are

µ(t) = γ0 + α {h(t)/[ λ – h(t)]} + ε(t)

Table 1. Results for the non-farm business sector
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[Percent of total
output]

.52

Margin (m1)

.50

.48

.46

.44

.42
-.2

-.1

.0

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

h2/(.2-h2) = growth tfp/(lambda - growth tfp)
Margin (m1)
Predicted margin [.05 x h2/(.2 - h2)]
Figure 6. Relationship between productivity growth and the gross margin
for private business sector.
Horizontal axis is the right hand side of equation (6) for the business sector
over the period 1949-2002 while the vertical axis is the Schumpeterian
margin. The slope is estimated to be 0.059, which is the estimated
appropriability ratio. Using these estimates, the share of Schumpeterian
profits is estimated to be 0.037 percent of total output.
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Appropriability
Ratio

Sector and method
Equilibrium: Annual
Linear equilibrium
Level +AR
Difference
Non-linear equilibrium
Level +AR
Difference
Equilibrium: Decadal
Linear equilibrium
Level +AR
Difference
Non-linear equilibrium
Level +AR
Difference

Equilibrium Share
of Schumpeterian
Profits
λ=
λ=
λ=
0.2
0.3
0.4

λ=
0.1

λ=
0.2

λ=
0.3

λ=
0.4

λ=
0.1

3.9%
3.8%

7.8%
7.5%

11.7%
11.3%

15.7%
15.0%

0.60%
0.57%

0.55%
0.53%

0.54%
0.52%

0.53%
0.51%

1.6%
1.5%

6.2%
5.9%

10.3%
9.9%

14.3%
13.7%

0.24%
0.22%

0.44%
0.42%

0.47%
0.45%

0.49%
0.47%

5.2%
5.2%

10.4%
10.4%

15.6%
15.7%

20.8%
20.9%

0.79%
0.79%

0.74%
0.74%

0.72%
0.72%

0.71%
0.71%

3.9%
3.9%

9.2%
9.1%

14.4%
14.2%

19.6%
19.4%

0.60%
0.59%

0.65%
0.64%

0.66%
0.65%

0.67%
0.66%

Table 2. Appropriability ratios and Schumpeterian profit margins for
different discount rates
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10%

lambda = 0.1

9%

lambda = 0.2

Appropriability ratio

8%
7%
6%
5%
4%
3%
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1%
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Year

Figure 7. Appropriability for Different Depreciation Rates
This figure shows the appropriability factor for an innovation as a function
of the appropriability ratio and the time since the innovation. The two
curves are for the two different depreciation rates as shown in Table 2.
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Appropriability
Ratio

Sector and method
Equilibrium: Annual
Linear equilibrium
Level +AR
Difference
Non-linear equilibrium
Level +AR
Difference
Equilibrium: Decadal
Linear equilibrium
Level +AR
Difference
Non-linear equilibrium
Level +AR
Difference

Table 1

Labor
productivity

0.078
0.075

0.073
0.070

0.062
0.059

0.046
0.043

0.104
0.104

0.121
0.121

0.092
0.091

0.094
0.091

Note: Table shows the estimated appropriability ratio for three different specifications:
column (1) is the main specification shown in Table 1
Column (2) is identical to column (1) except that the productivity concept is
output per hour worked.

Table 3. Appropriability ratios for different specifications
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Figure 8. Schumpeterian profits as percent of total corporate profits
This figure shows total Schumpeterian profits in the non-farm business sector as
percent of total corporate profits. These are calculated by applying the estimated
parameters to BLS’s estimate of multifactor productivity growth. Estimated
Schumpeterian profits were 3.8 percent of total profits over the 1948 – 2001 period.
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V. Implications for Profits and Wealth
In this section, we consider the implications of this analysis for the
stock market and for the “Greenspan effect.”
A. Schumpeterian profits and the stock market
In the late 1990s, the stock market rose sharply, particularly in the
“new economy” sectors of computers, software, and communications.
There were many reasons put forth for the dramatic rise, but many
analysts pointed to the impact of rapid technological change on profits
and stock values. To put this in the language of this study, if the rapid
growth in innovation has led to an accompanying rapid growth in
Schumpeterian profits, then the present value of future profits would rise
sharply.
To put this quantitatively, consider the following example: The
new economy amounts to 5 percent of nominal output. Up to an initial
period (1995?), productivity is perceived to be growing at the same rate
as in other sectors. Then, a rapid acceleration of productivity growth
occurs. In the new world, costless multifactor productivity growth is 15
percent per year. Assuming total output is $10 trillion in the initial year,
the new economy would be adding about $75 billion per year per year in
social surplus in the initial year. If the new entrepreneurs could capture
90 percent of the new economy surplus in Schumpeterian profits with
low depreciation, then with other plausible parameters, the increase in
value of new economy firms would be $5.8 trillion.9 This is close to the
increase in value of new economy firms from 1995 to 2000.
The problem with this scenario, however, is that the likelihood of
new economy entrepreneurs capturing half of the social surplus is
The assumptions behind this are the following: I assume that the new economy is
5 percent of a $10 trillion economy; that the new economy is growing at 6 percent
per year in real terms (in nominal values deflated by the GDP price index) for the
first 20 years, then at 3 percent after that; that entrepreneurs appropriate half of
the social value of technological change; that the rate of costless technological
change is 15 percent per year; and that the real discount rate on earnings is10
percent per year. Under these assumptions, the present value of new economy
earnings is $7.2 trillion when discounting the profits for the first 50 years, which is
$5.8 trillion more than the value would be if the new economy had the same
parameters as the old economy.
9
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vanishingly small. One reason for doubting a high appropriability is, as
shown by the results in this study, that U.S. capitalism grinds
Schumpeterian profits into such a fine powder that they can barely be
detected in the macroeconomic. If the new economy entrepreneurs could
capture 7 percent of the social gains – which is a good guess based on our
estimates – then under the assumptions above the increase in the market
value of the excess profits from the productivity acceleration would be
$410 billion rather than to $5.8 trillion. (This $410 billion would, of
course, be in excess to the normal return to capital and intangible
investments.)
A second reason to be skeptical of high Schumpeterian profits in
the new economy is because of the nature of the industry. With a few
exceptions, entry and exit is relatively easy; the rapidity of the entry and
easy demise of new economy firms indicates not only that bright ideas
could get easily funded but also, alas, that imitators are quick to follow.
One way that the high entry and exit will affect Schumpeterian profits is
through the depreciation rate, which is likely to be very high in neweconomy sectors. Etoys.com sounded like a great idea for toys; but ToysR-Us had more savvy and toys and could easily and quickly adopt the
bright ideas of the first movers. In reality, both are bankrupt today.
While we have incomplete information on the aggregate profits of neweconomy firms, it appears that at the peak of the cycle in 2000, profits in
this industry were actually negative.10
A third reason to doubt the presence of large Schumpeterian profits
is that the information revolution concerns information, which is
generally hard to appropriate. The economic nature of information is that
it is expensive to produce and inexpensive to reproduce. Indeed, with the
Internet, it is often essentially free to reproduce and distribute vast
amounts of information. The low costs of imitation, transmission, and
distribution of information technologies are likely to erode the value of
property rights in intellectual property and reduce the durability of
Schumpeterian profits in the new economy. An illustrative case is the
appropriability of the value of knowledge embedded in encyclopedias.
The Bureau of Economic Analysis publishes corporate profits by industry for
three new economy industries using the new industrial classification system
(NAIQS) for the period 1998-2002: Computer and electronic products, Electrical
equipment, appliances, and components, and Information. Profits for these
industries was $-8 billion in 2000 and was negative for every year thereafter. (Data
are from Table 6.16D in the NIPA tables at www.bea.gov.)
10

24

To imitate the Encyclopedia Britannica two decades ago would have
required a massive investment in recruiting of scholars and editors along
with a major publishing effort. Today, an online or CD encyclopedia is
extremely inexpensive to produce and distribute, and some are free to
consumers, such as Microsoft’s online Encarta. Indeed, the Internet is
itself a gigantic free encyclopedia.
B. The Greenspan Effect
In the late 1990s, productivity and the economy were growing
rapidly, and some economists wondered whether there was a linkage
through the stock market. Just such an effect was suggested by Federal
Reserve Alan Greenspan:
Productivity-driven supply growth has, by raising long-term profit
expectations, engendered a huge gain in equity prices. Through the so-called
“wealth effect,” these gains have tended to foster increases in aggregate
demand beyond the increases in supply….
[In] recent years, largely as a result of the appreciating values of ownership
claims on the capital stock, themselves a consequence, at least in part, of
accelerating productivity, the net worth of households has expanded
dramatically, relative to income. This has spurred private consumption to rise
even faster than the incomes engendered by the productivity-driven rise in
output growth.11

I define the Greenspan effect as the impact of rising productivity on
aggregate demand through the wealth effect on consumption. Chairman
Greenspan suggests not only that the impact is positive, but also that it is
larger than the impact on aggregate supply.
The estimates provided here allow an estimate of the size of the
Greenspan effect operating through private consumption. For this
purpose, assume that all of output is produced in publicly owned
corporations and that all productivity growth is driven by domestic
innovation. From these, we deduce following from the model in section I.
The current value of Schumpeterian profits as a fraction of corporate
output is V = αh*/(λ – h*), and the value of equities is the discounted
value of that. Suppose that economy-wide productivity rises
permanently by ∆h* percent per year. Further, assume that the marginal
Remarks by Chairman Alan Greenspan, “Technology and the economy,” Before
the Economic Club of New York, New York, New York, January 13, 2000 at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2000/200001132.htm.
11
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propensity to consume out of wealth is w. Using the empirical estimates
from section II (α = .07 with λ = 0.2) and these assumptions, the ratio of
the present value of Schumpeterian profits to corporate output is 4.8
percent when productivity growth is 1 percent per year, while that ratio
is 10.8 percent with productivity growth of 2 percent per year. Using the
value of w of 0.04, the increase in consumption from an unanticipated
increase in productivity growth by 1 percentage point is .04 x (.108 - .048)
= 0.24 percent of total output.12
Hence for the estimated value of the parameters, an unanticipated 1
percent increase in multifactor productivity that is driven entirely by
appropriable innovation will lead in the first year to a 1 percent increase
in potential output and a 0.24 percentage point increase in consumption.
This calculation suggests that the Greenspan effect on aggregate demand
through consumption is about one-quarter of the effect on potential
output, and that this impact of productivity growth through the
Greenspan effect is not inflationary.
C. Conclusion
The present study develops a technique for estimating the size of
Schumpeterian profits in a market economy. It shows that innovational
profits depend upon the appropriability of innovations as well as the rate
of depreciation of profits from the innovations. Using data from the U.S.
nonfarm business section, I estimate that innovators are able to capture
about 2.2 percent of the total social surplus from innovation. This
number results from a low rate of initial appropriability (estimated to be
around 7 percent) along with a high rate of depreciation of
Schumpeterian profits (judged to be around 20 percent per year). In
terms of the rate of profit on capital, the rate of profit on the replacement
cost of capital over the 1948-2001 period is estimated to be 0.19 percent
per year.

The calculation becomes more complicated if we correct for the fact that the
corporate output is only about 60 percent of total GDP and that only part of the
return to capital is earned by public corporations. If all MFP growth in confined to
public corporations, then the numbers in the text will all be scaled down by the
ratio of the output of public corporations to GDP but the ratio, 0.24, will be
unchanged. If some of MFP growth occurs outside of public corporations, then the
ratio would be smaller to the extent that business owners are constrained from
consuming according to the underlying consumption model.
12
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One reaction to these numbers is that the rate of Schumpeterian
profits is implausibly low given the enormous innovativeness of the
American economy. Another reaction is that it clears up at least part of a
puzzle about the profitability of American capitalism. Some observers
have wondered why the rate of profit on corporate capital is so low.
Indeed, over the last four decades in which we have careful
measurement, the rate of profit after tax on nonfinancial corporations
averaged 5.9 percent per year, which was very close to the cost of capital
over that period. How could the rate of profit be so low, it might be
asked, given that the denominator omits several important assets (such
as land and intangible investments) and the numerator includes
important sources of profits (such as monopoly power and
Schumpeterian profits)? At least part of this puzzle is resolved here by
the finding that only 20 basis points of the rate of return to capital was
due to Schumpeterian profits.

27

